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INTRODUCTION 
The conference mandate specifies that the papers should 
demonst rate the possible contri�utions social science disciplines 
other than economics can make to the study of regulatory policy 
making. That seems an innocent enough request in the case of 
psychology and a nthropology, but perhaps less so in the case of law 
and political science. These latter disciplines already possess large 
literatures on the subject of regulation. Thus, our mandate would 
seem to imply that these literatures amount to less of a contribution 
than their size might suggest. The lawyers can speak for themselves 
-- they always do -- but what about political science? 
Having explored the political science literature on regulation 
in recent years, it appears to me that political scientists too often 
overlook their discipline's comparative advantages. When it comes to 
describing the consequences of regulation economists have an edge 
(though political scientists pay relatively greater homage to 
distributional gods), and when it comes to description of the ongoing 
regulatory process, lawyers versed in administrative law, sociologists 
knowledgeable in the ways of orga nizations, and journalists steeped in 
context, all have a specific strength on which to build. Granted, 
political scientists can a nd do learn economics, law, sociology and 
journalism, but what special strength do political scientists have, 
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especially if they reject -- as some do -- the notion that the larger 
political system exerts a systematic and significant influence on 
regulation? W hat is the distinctive contribution professional 
political scientists, qua political scientists, can make to the study 
of regulation? 
The answer, I think, is pretty obvious. When economists 
evaluate the outcomes of a regulatory program they are judging the 
ultimate consequences of choices made by elected officials who 
authorized the program. When lawyers, sociologists, journalists and 
others observe the operation of the regulatory process they are 
viewing behavior undertaken within the constraints imposed by the 
elected officials who set that process in motion. From a political 
science standpoint, the first question in the study of regulation 
should ask why we have a policy at all an inquiry typically 
undertaken in blow-by-blow descriptive fashion. And once the 
existence question is addressed, the obvious and perhaps more 
interesting corollary arises: why does the policy take the form that 
it does? Under what conditions do legislators delegate to 
administrators rather than rely on judicial enforcement of statute law 
(the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887 is a watershed), A shrug of the 
shoulders and a sigh that "It's all so complex nowadays" falls short 
of an adequate scientific explanation. Under what conditions do 
legislators adopt specific mandates (e. g. parts of the Clean Air and 
Clean Water Acts) rather than vague and platidinous wish lists (e. g. 
the Communications Act of 1934)? This is the concern which Lowi 
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(1979) has eloquently articulated. Under what conditions do 
legislators opt for command and control (Schultze, 1977) policy 
instruments rather than conceivable alternatives which have superior 
efficiency properties? Frustrated economists criticize such perceived 
nonoptimal choices. Questions like these suggest a natural political 
science focus on regulatory origin which in turn suggests a focus on 
legislatures, for regulatory origin is in great part a legislative 
game. 
This paper takes an initial stab at the delegation question. 
What incentives lead legislators to delegate not only the 
administration but even the formulation of public policy to unelected 
officials? A variety of considerations are relevan�, but my focus 
will be on political (rather than managerial) incentives to delegate. 
The next section of the paper develops a simple framework in which the 
later discussion can be conducted. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In analy zing legislative calculations I will build on 
Shepsle's and Weingast's (1980) discussion of legislator objectives in 
a single member district system. Their model postulates that a 
legislator attempts to maximize his probability of re-election, which 
is assumed to be a monotonically increasing function of the district 
net benefits function: 
Nj(x) = b1j(x) + c1j(x) - c2j(x) - tjT(x) (1) 
N.(x) represents the net benefits to district j from a government 
J 
activity, project or program carried out at a level, x, where x is a 
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vector of characteristics describing the policy. b.(x ) summarizes the 
J 
benefits of the government activity to district j, while c1j(x)
summarizes direct program expenditures in district j. Note that the 
legislator regards these as benefits, i . e .  c1 costs appear with a plus 
sign in the net benefit function . Direct program expenditures in 
other districts, of course, are regarded as costs . These accrue in a 
total tax bill, T(x ) ,  of which district j pays a share, t . •  Finally, 
J 
c2j represent the external or indirect costs of a program (e . g. 
compliance costs, higher prices ) .  All benefits and costs are present-
value discounted . 
The preceding formulation is a generalization of analyses of 
distributive (i. e . particularized ) policy making (Fiorina, 1 9 81; 
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1 981 ) . Distributive policy is a 
special case in w hich c2 j  costs are regarded as zero by the 
legislator. Shepsle and Weingast (1980) sug gest that regulatory 
policy might be treated as a special case in which the legislator 
regards public expenditure costs as negligible (Green and Nader, 1 973; 
Weidenbaum, 1980 ) , thus reducing (1 ) to the following simple 
formulation: 
N. (x ) J b/ xl - c2/ xl (2 ) 
If the benefit function is assumed to increase with the components of 
x at a marginally decreasing rate while the cost function increases at 
a marginally increasing rate, then (2 ) will be single peaked. 
Moreover, if x is taken to be a scalar measure of government 
involvement, then Black's median dominance theorem yields a majority 
rule equilibrium in the legislature, namely the median of the 
individual legislators' maxima, med max N. (x ) . At equilibrium, 
j x J 
marginal benefits equal ma�gin�l costs for the median legislator, and 
if the net benefits functions are normalized so that the net benefits 
of the status quo are zero, then bj(x ) 2 cj(x) for a majority of the 
legislators .  Though the assumption of a scalar x is very helpful in 
the search for legislative equilibrium, it is not necessary for an 
analysis of the induced preferences of individual legislators . 
From a formal standpoint (2 ) is so simple as to appear 
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trivial . From a substantiv e standpoint, however, (2) implicitly makes 
a number of nontrivial presumptions . First is the aforementioned 
district orientation : legislators evaluate government policies solely 
in terms of benefit and cost incidences on their districts . This 
assumption is probably more accurate than not, though the increasing 
geographic mobility of campaign resources introduces some slippa ge. 
Second, (2) assumes a retrospective voting elector ate . The 
incumbent's probability of re-election depends not on his position 
vis-a-vis a challenger, but on the actual delivery of benefits to the 
district . Given information level� in national elections (Fiorina, 
1 982 ) , this assumption too, appears to be more accur ate than not. 
Third, (2) assumes that legislators maximize issue-by-issue, which 
would seem to imply a considerable degree of issue independence or 
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separability . While in many c a se s  the latter does not hold, in view 
of legislator uncertainty about the future shape of the agenda 
(Fiorina, 1974, pp . 81-83), legislator s proceed one issue at a time 
anyway. Finally, ( 2 )  is an "obj ective" calculation; it summarizes the 
actual benefits and cost s  of government activity (discounted, but by 
constituents, not the legislator ) . In reality , benefits and cost s are 
rarely fully and/or symmetrically perceived . In the distributive 
arena, from which the model arose, the a s sumption is rea sonable 
because of the tangible nature of government programs. When we move 
to the regulatory arena, however, particularly the newer regulation, 
the costs and benefits of government programs are far more difficult 
to identify, let alone attribute . 
Two general clas se s  of factor s would produce les s  than perfect 
perception and attribution of programmatic effects .  The first is 
characteristics of the effects themselves -- what is their nature and 
to w hom do they accrue? The second is characteristics of the program 
-- the proces s  by which effect s  are produced affect s  how they are 
ultimately attributed . The body of this paper takes one factor from 
eac h  class and analyzes its effects via further modifications of ( 2) .  
From the first cla s s  we take group concentr ation, and from the second 
we take delegation of legislative power . Is there any relationship 
between the two? 
GROUP CONCENTRATION 
The first modification of ( 2 )  involves recognition that the 
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benefits and cost s  of government programs are not perfectly perceived . 
Indeed, legislators spend consider able time and effort trying to 
enhance perceptions of program benefits (Mayhew, 1974). Thus, the 
legislator would begin with a net benefits function which takes 
account of the probabilities with which changes in district welfare 
( i. e.  net political benefits )  will be a s sociated with government 
programs : 
Nj ( x ) pjbj( x )  - qjcj ( x )  (3) 
where 0 � pj, qj � 1 
Consider two clas ses of benefits, one of which comes in the form of 
official U . S .  Treasury checks, the second of which comes in the form 
of cleaner air .  Other thing s equal, the first entails a much higher p 
than the second. Similarly, consider two costs, one of which comes in 
the form of a draft notice, the second of which comes in the form of a 
.01% increase in the inflation r ate. Other things equal ( hard to 
imagine in this case )  the first entails a much higher q than the 
second . The probabilities in question may reflect a v ariety of 
factor s other than the form of the benefits and costs, but I a s sume 
that the legislator takes all relev ant v ariables into account 
( including his own ability to affect ,P and q) and forms estimates 
which obey the laws of probability .1 
The second neces sary modification of ( 2 )  reflects the fact 
that a legislator know s that he generally will not be held solely 
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accountable for the perceived net benefits. He can appropriate credit 
for a share, a., less than the ful l  perceived benefits, and wil l J 
suffer blame for a share, s., less than the ful l perceived costs . J 
magnitudes of these shares wil l  reflect a variety of factors, 
including the l egisl ator's party, committee positions, 'perceived 
reputation, and so forth, but gener a l l y  speaking, the "bigger" the 
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issue, the l ess accountabl e  is an individual representative for the 
perceived benefits and costs.2 When modified for anticipated success 
in c l aiming credit and shifting b l ame (3) becomes (4): 
Nj (x) aj pj b/ x> - sj qj cj (x) (4) 
where 0 � aj ' sj 
s 1 
Cal l (4) the pol itically rel evant net benefits function. Initial ly, I 
wil l  not treat x as v ariab l e .  Instead assume that x has been 
exogeneous l y  specified by the executive, party leaders, an interest 
group or some other actor with agenda power . Then, in deciding 
whether or not to support x the r ank and f ile l egisl ator wil l 
cal cul ate the politically relevant net benefits and support x if (4) 
is positive, i.e.  if 
ajpj 
sj qj 
c. {x)_J__ 
b. (x)
J 
the l egisl ator wil l support the proposed pol icy . 
(4') 
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Thus, ( 2) is a special case of (4) in which information is 
perfect (p = q = 1) or at l east symmetric (p = q), and pol itical 
responsibility is total (a = s = 1) or again, symmetric (a = s) . As 
mentioned, where benefits and costs are very tangible, and where the 
individual legisl ator carries the bal l as in the distributive arena 
(Ferej ohn, 1974), the special case may be approximated . But (4) is a 
more realistic formul ation wken we examine government programs more
complicated than cement-pouring . 
From the standpoint of government efficiency the imp l ications 
of (4) are discouraging . Weingast, Sheps le, and Johnsen (1981) have 
demonstrated that an assembly of district representatives would be 
exceedingly unlikely to choose a policy ef ficient in the standard 
sense of equation of marginal social benefits and costs . Condition 
(4') above suggests how district representatives could f avor programs 
not efficient even in the weak sense of benefits in excess of costs. 
If the legisl ator bel ieves that the benefits of the program are more 
visible than the costs (p > q), and/or that he can c l aim credit for a 
program's benefits while evading responsibil ity for its costs (a > s),
he wil l f avor programs whose costs to his district exceed benefits . 
Consider the fol lowing consequences of various p/q and a/s r atios: 
a/s 
1 .00 
1 . 50 
2.00 
1.00 
1 .00 
1.5 0 
2 .00 
1 .50 
1 .50 
2.25 
3 .00 
p/q 
2 .00 
2.00 
3.00 
4.00 
2.5 0 
2.50 
3.7 5 
5 .00 
3 .00 
3 .00 
4 . 50 
6.00 
1 0  
The table entries show the maximum cost/benefit ratios for which a 
legisl ator would support a pol icy under the specified conditions .  
Thus, i f  a l egisl ator bel ieves that program bene fits a r e  twice a s  
l ikely to be noticed as program costs, and that h e  could c l aim credit 
for a portion of the benefits twice as great as the costs for which he 
would bear responsibil ity, then he would be wil ling to support a 
program whose costs to his district were four times as great as the 
benefits. Mayhew ( 1974) has discussed the Congressional penchant for 
programs whose benefits are highl ighted and costs hidden, and a l so 
Congressional procedures for c l aiming c redits and evading costs, so 
there is reason to bel ieve that l egisl ative "sins of commission" as 
described above occur with some f requency . 
Of course, an even-handed treatment should note that opposing 
asymmetries produce ine f ficiences of the opposite nature. Consider 
the fol l owing examples : 
a/s 
.2 S 
.so 
• 7 S
1 .00 
.2 S 
.06 
.13 
.1 9 
.2 S 
.so 
.13 
.2 S 
.3 8 
.so 
p/q 
.7 S 
.1 9 
.38 
.S6 
• 7 S
1 .00 
.2 S 
.so 
• 7 S
1 .00 
These examples show how legisl ative "sins of omission" occur . If a 
legisl ator bel ieves that the benefits of a program are onl y hal f as 
visible as the costs and that he is twice as l ikely to bear 
responsibil ity for the costs as receive credit for the benefits, then 
he would decl ine to support a program whose benefits to his district 
were not at l east four times greater than its costs . 3 Under those 
conditions the pol itical ly rel evant net benefits of a program whose 
cost/benefit r atio was only one-third would be negative. 
It seems likely that a l l  the various social science 
discipl ines have something to say about the variables and conditions 
which would produce the kinds' or· asymmetries il lustrated above. The 
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one I wil l focus on is the rel ative concentration of those who receive 
the benefits and bear the costs of government programs . There is 
widespread a greement on the importance of group concentr ation for 
public policy formation. Schattschneider ( 1939), Buchanan and Tul lock 
( 1 962) and Lowi ( 1964) consider benefit concentration and cost 
dif fusion to be the hal lmark of distributive pol itics, and in the 
regul atory realm Stigler ( 1971 ), Peltzman ( 1976), and Wilson 
( 197 6,1 980) a l l identify the distributions of regul atory benefits and 
burdens as a c ritical variab l e. Because the preceding names span a 
wide r ange ot the methodological and ideol ogical continua, obj ections 
arising from such sources should be minimized by focusing on the 
concentration v ariable.  
When analysts attribute a l egisl ative action to the rel ative 
concentr ation of regul atory burdens and benefits, what precise 
mechanisms underlie their arguments? Taking the asymmetric cases, 
concentrated benefits/dif fused costs '(CB/DC) and dif fused 
benefits/concentr ated costs (DB/CC), one could interpret the effects 
of rel ative dif ferences in concentr ation in terms of the asymmetries 
prev iously di scus sed. 4 A plaus ibl e interpr etation of l e g i s l ator 
support of "special intere st" legislation would be that 
p. ) q., and a. > sj . The per capita stake of the losers i s  sma
l l .
J J J 
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Thus, they are relativ ely less l ikely to real ize the i r  los se s from the 
unfavorable l e g i s l ation and to recognize any rol e the i r  repr e sentative 
played in its pa s sage . The member s  of the s pe c i a l  interest, however, 
have a high per capita stake, a greater incentive to bear information 
costs -- perhaps enough to inv e st in a trade as sociation or other 
formal organization. They are l ikely both to rea l ize the effects of 
government actions on the i r  wel fare, and to keep tabs on the actions 
of individual l e g i slator s .  The expected r e sult? Leg i s l ative s ins of 
commi s sion. 
In contrast, symmetrical arguments l ead to an interpretation 
of the DB/CC case as pj < qj ' and aj < sj . The concentrated and
perhaps organized inter e st s  who bear the cost s are aware of those 
costs and the l e g i s l ators who impo sed them, whereas the diffused and 
probably unorganized bene f iciar i e s  may not be cogni zant of the 
benef its, let alone who prov ided them. The expected r e sult i s  
l e g i sl ative s i n s  of omi s s ion. 
The d i scus s ion thus far has pre suppo sed l eg i s l ativ e  
con sideration of a s i n g l e  pol icy opt ion. Gene ral ly, o f  cour se, there 
are a variety of means to the same end . What is most important for 
our purpo se s, is that alternative means typical ly produce different 
pol itical ly rel evant ne t benefit functions . Some w il l  involve cl ear 
difference s in benefits or costs, as when pub l ic pol icy decr e e s  that 
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the path to cl ean water l ie s  in a tr eatment pl ant for every community 
rather than effluent taxe s .  Or, different alternative s  may induce 
different pol itica l ly rel evant ne t benefits by producing d ifferent 
p, q, a, or s e st imate s .  The costs of cl ean water, for exampl e, might 
be smal ler but more v i s ibl e if each household and firm rece ived a 
monthly effluent tax b il l ,  Other alternativ e s  m ight serve to l e s sen 
the l eg i s l ator's pe rce iv ed re sponsibil ity for the impacts of a 
program. One such al ternative is de l e gation of l e g i slative authority 
to adm ini strative agenc i e s .  
DELFGATION 
Observers who complain about the suppo sed Congre s s ional 
penchant for bureaucratic command and control actual ly confl ate two 
charge s  -- that inefficient pol icy instruments are chosen, and that an 
inefficient or otherwi se unde s i rable bureaucratic mode of 
impl ementation and e nforcement is adopted . Both charge s  are 
important, but I wil l  confine myse l f  to the se cond, less obvious one . 
To the contemporary observer l e g i s l ativ e rel iance on the 
administrative proce s s  l ooks very natur al .  Sug ge st ions that 
enforcement of publ ic pol ici e s  should depend on the initiative of the 
indiv idual l iti gant se em unnatural, if not sil ly .  It was not always 
so. Congre s s  fought for more than a decade over propo sal s to regulate 
the rail roads, and though the short..:. haul long-haul controve r sy is
better known, the most important i s sue concerned the method of 
adm in i stering the proposed l aw. According to Cushman ( 1941 , p ,  45) : 
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The f irst maj or problem and a l so the l ast which confronted those 
working for the feder al regulation of railways was whether or not 
a commission should be set up to administer the l aw. It was 
general ly agreed that fede r al control had become imper ative, but 
those supporting such control were divided into two camps. The 
f irst, led by Judge Reagan of Texas, and chairman of the House 
Committee on Interst a te and Foreign Commerce, demanded dr astic 
regul a tion by sta tute to be enforced directly by the Department 
of Justice and the courts. Reagan was abl e  to carry the House 
with him to the very l ast . The other group, headed by Sena tor 
Cul l om, a former governor of I l linois insisted that federal 
regul a tion of railways shou l d  be administered through a 
commission set up for that purpose. This vital difference of 
opinion persisted throughout the entire period of discussion and 
was only adj usted, as we have seen, in conference committee a few 
weeks before the actual passage of the Act of 1887 . 
Judge Reagan's "drastic regul ation by statute" provided that viol ators 
sha l l  forfeit and pay to the person or persons w ho may sust ain 
damage thereby a sum equal to three times the amount of the 
damages so sust ained, to be recovered by the person or persons so 
damaged by suit in any dist rict or circuit court of the United 
States • • •  and the person or persons so offending shall for 
each offence forfeit and pay a penal ty of not less that one 
thous and dol l ars • • •  one-hal f  of such penal ty or penal ties 
to be paid to the informer ( Haney, 191 0, p. 296). 
As the years passed, delega tion to administr ative agencies may have 
come to seem more natural, but even if del egation never again created 
controversy (which is not true), the political decision of 1 887 c a l ls 
for exp l ana tion.5 
Even in the absence of historical evidence of a pol itical 
choice between administ rative and legal-judicial forms of regul ation, 
one could stil l raise the question, why not a ttempt to regu l ate 
without extensive reliance on bureaucr a tic entities? Some academic 
critics of current safety and health regu l ation argue that ca reful 
design of liability l aw could provide firms with incentives to adopt 
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safety and heal th standards which in the long run would b e  equa l ly 
beneficial and f ar less cost ly than current regulatory approaches. Or 
to take a l ess hypothetical example, in the deba te over the Civil 
Rights Act of 1 964 the individual v .  federal role in enforcement was 
the subj ect of much at tention, Consider that incentives-based schemes 
for regul a ting environmental pol lution would probably lessen 
l egisl a tive rel iance on the administra tive process. Constitutional 
l imita tions on legisl ative delega tion of the taxing power would 
virtua l ly require that Congress set emissions tax l evels (probably 
with the aid of special ized committee sta ff); the role of 
administr a tors would be downgraded to one simil ar to that of the IRS. 
One can make cogent arguments a gainst proposals like the foregoing, to 
be sure, but that is equal ly true of the existing administra tive forms 
of regu l a tion. Why then, do l egisl a tors delega te, or, to foreshadow 
l a ter discussion, under what conditions do they delegate? 
The most common expl anation of legislative delega tion is 
complexity. This expl ana tion views delega tion as an inevitabl e 
fea ture of modern society. Problems are complex; time and other 
resources scarce; therefore, delega tion. Certainly there is some 
merit in such arguments, but a l ittle thought suggests that other 
considerations must be important as wel l .  
I n  the first pl ace, where is i t  shown that the compl exity of 
public probl ems has grown f aster than the capacities of elected 
officials to deal with them? The amateur legislators of the 
nineteenth century spent four to five months per year in Washington 
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spend ful l time o n  the j ob and are served b y  approximately 25, 000 
staff employees . Consider too that the j ustifica tion (though not the 
expl anation) for the tr ansformation of the Congress into first, 
committee government, and then subcommittee government, was the 
purported specialized expertise such a division of l abor would foster. 
Perhaps increases in resources and expertise have not kept pace with 
the increasing complexity of social and economic problems, but the 
ca se is not prima facie obvious . 
Furthermore, Congress has delega ted sel ectively, not acro s s  
the board . And complexity i s  not the key variable.  As  Jaf fe (197 3 ,  
pp . 1 1 89- 1 1 90) observes, "The monumental detail o f  the tax code 
suggest s that Congress can, and does l egisl ate with great specificity 
when it regards a matter as suf ficiently important ." This is not to 
deny any role for the IRS, but Congress does not p a s s  tax bil l s  
stating that the IR S  should set tax rates for the "pub l ic interest, 
convenience, and nece s si ty . "6 There are any number of seeming ly
complex i s sues regarding which Congres s has chosen to legis l ate. 
Where the incentive exist s, legislators choose to deal with complexity 
and find the time and resources to do it . 
A second rea son to doubt the complexity exp l ana tion of 
delegation arises from an honest look at the ability of the 
administr ative system to deal with complexity . "How could we po s sibly 
expect Congress to draw up st andards for liter al ly thousands of 
dangerous subst ances; delega tion to an agency is obviously nece s sary . "  
But has delega tion sol ved the problem? TOSCA authorizes EPA to 
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regul ate more than 50,000 potentia l l y  hazardous substances, Thus f ar, 
EPA has managed t o  address an aver age of less than one chemical per 
year of effor t . 7 Is it not conceiv abl e  th at augmented Congres sional 
st affs could deal with complex is sues equa l ly competent ly and perhaps 
consider ab l y  faster than executive or independent agencies? 8 
Nor is it obvious that the tr aditional legal system is 
incapable of handling modern 'com�lex problem s .  Special ized cour t s  
al ready exist, and speaking gener al ly o f  delegation t o  administrative 
agencies, Posner (1977, p .  4 80) argues 
The idea w a s  that Congress could not deal efficiently with the 
technical ,  particul aristic, rapidly changing problems of a 
compl ex modern industry such as r ail roading • • • •  But this is an 
unconvincing expl ana tion for the creation of the independent 
agencie s .  The regul ation of rail roads and of other industries 
that have been brought under the administrative proce s s  could 
j ust a s  wel l have been delega ted to the courts, whose tr aditional 
province is precisely to formul ate rules governing rel atively 
technical economic activity, using (as we have seen) neut r al, 
apol itical criteria such as efficiency. One can argue that the 
ca se method constr ains the rulemaking effectiveness of the 
cour t s, but since the agencies have with rare exceptions relied 
exclusivel y on the ca se method a s  their legisl ative technique the 
argument provides little basis for preferring agencies to cour t s .  
In short, the obj ective complexity o f  a pub l ic policy matter i s  f a r  
from a suf f icient expl anation for broad delegations o f  legisl ative 
authority . 
A second expl anation of delega tion focuses not so much on 
legisl ative minimization of decision-making cost s as on the quality of 
the resul ting decisions .  This is the ol d public administration model 
of the nonpol itical administr ative proce s s .  According to this 
venerable view the administr ative proce s s  has certain inherent 
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advantages over j udicial enforcement o f  le gisl ativ e enactments . 
First , administr ation is conducted by nonpolitical officials who c arry 
out the pol icy as intended by Congress.  In contr ast , dependence on 
the l egal system entails de l ays, prohibitiv e expense s ,  inconsistency 
of l e gal interpretation across j urisdictions , and so forth. Secondly,  
the administr ative process is more f l exible than the l egal process . 
Rathe r  than embed public pol icy into l aw the Congress can state its 
gene ral intent and al low the agency to fine tune the l aw to f it 
changing e conomic , social and technological conditions . Third, the 
compl e xity argument again, administr ation is conducted by experts who 
wil l do a j ob superior to nonexpert l e gisl ators and j udge s .  
Whatever the merits o f  such arguments a t  one time , ther e  is 
l ittl e  in our overal l historica l  experience which j ustifies the benign 
view of administr ative regul ation presupposed by the good gover nment 
mode l .  Such arguments stil l provide rhetorical ammunition on 
occasion, but it is doubtful that many serious observers regard them 
as the principal expl anation for l e gisl ativ e de l e gation. 
In its essential respects the compl exity argument holds that 
de l egation to administr ators minimizes l egisl ativ e de cision costs , 
wher e  the costs in question are "politica l ly neutr al" -- time,  
patience , sta f fers, and other resour ce s .  A number of obse rvers , 
however, see in de l egation an opportunity for l egisl ators to minimize 
pol itical costs . Wol l comments ( 1977 ,  p. 1 7 3) :  
A maj or r eason for the power o f  the bureaucracy in pol icy 
formul ation is the frequent l ac k  of congressional incentives to 
adhere to the Schecter rul e  and establish explicit standards for 
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administr ative action. This is particul arly true i n  the 
regul atory realm, an area involving pol itica l  conf lict that 
l e gisl ators often wish to avoid. Congress is always wil ling to 
de al rhetorically with problems requiring regul ation and with the 
area of regul atory reform but real de cisions on the part of the 
l e gisl ature wil l undoubtedly raise the ire of powerful pressure 
groups on one side or the other that are affected by government 
regul ation. 
By charging an agency with impl ementation of the regul atory mandate , 
l egisl ators not only avoid the time and trouble of making spe cific 
de cisions, they also avoid or at l east disguise their responsibility 
for the consequences of the de cisions ultimately made . In te rms of 
the model developed e arl ier, de l egation af fects l egisl ators' estimates 
of a and s .  Delegation of l e gisl ative authority to administr ators 
shifts the r esponsibil ity for the costs and bene f its pub l ic policies 
produce. 
The r emainder of this paper applies the l egisl ative cal cul us 
developed e arlier to the "shift the responsibil ity" theory of 
de l egation. In orde r to focus cl early on the factor of diminished 
r esponsibility a number of c eteris paribus assumptions wil l be made . 
Policy instruments wil l be held constant so that the simp l e  f act of 
de l egation does not alter the association of bene fits and costs with 
government activities (estimates of p and q) , nor the actual bene fits 
and costs themse lves. I assume that de l egation onl y  p l aces added 
pol itical daylight between the l e gisl ators and those who f e el the 
incidence ot legisl ative actions. ·In other words , de l egation does not 
change the actual pol icy x that is adopted; rather, legisl ators agree 
with Mayhew ( 1974, p .  1 3 5) that "there is every reason to b e l ieve 
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that the regul atory agencies do what Congress wants them to do." 
Thus, for the present time I am skirting the principal concern of 
Professor Lowi, delegation without standards, which al lows the l aw to 
be brokered, bargained and otherwise continuously tr ansformed by 
administr ators.  Shifting legisl ative responsibility to administr ators 
may wel l have an effect on the ul timate benefits and costs of the 
program, but for now I ignore that complication.9 
GROUP CONCENTRATION AND SHIFI'ING 1HE RESPONSIBILITY 
Whereas earlier the hypothetica l  legisl ator was deciding 
whether to support a particu l ar pol ic y, we now permit the l egisl ator 
to choose between alternative means of implementing the pol icy. 
Define two conditional net benefits functions, one conditioned on a 
broad delegation of pol icy to an administr ative agency (D), and one 
conditioned on a narrow del egation to a housekeeping agency or, as in 
the previousl y  cited Reagan bil l, no del egation to an agency at a l l  
(L): 
N.(x) ID J 
d aj pj bj (x) 
d sj qj cj (x) 
1 1 N.(x) I L = a,p,b,(x) - s.qj c.(x)J J J J  J J 
The shift the responsibility (SR) assumptions are as fol lows: 
1 d 1 d aj > aj , sj > sj 
(Sa) 
(Sb) 
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That is, the l egisl ator bel ieves that a broad delegation l essens his 
perceived responsibil ity for the ultimate costs of the program more 
than a narrow delegation (rec a l l  how quickly protest centered on 
Congress after the FDA acted to ban saccharin under the Del aney 
cl ause). The narrower the delegation the l ess able is the l egisl ator 
to c l aim that the agency (or court) acted in viol ation of his 
understanding of the l aw .  Oh the other hand, a broad delegation wil l 
also l essen the legisl ator's abil ity to c l aim credit more than a 
na rrow del egation, because the perception of the agency as an 
independent actor responsible for its own decisions wil l be stronger .  
Thus, there wil l be a tr ade-off between a l egisl ator's loss i n  ability 
to c l aim credit and gain in abil ity to shift b l ame, and his attitude 
toward del egation wil l hinge on the tr ade- off. The legisl ator wil l 
prefer the broad delegation if ( Sa) is greater than (Sb) which implies 
1 d 
� 
1 d aj - aj 
q. b. (x) 
...:.J. > .....,L_ pj c j (x) 
( s.) 
The compar ative statics of (S') are intuitively pl ausible. Ceteris 
paribus, legisl ator preferences for delegation increase with the costs 
of the pol icy, the probabil ity of associating those costs with 
government policy ( q), the probabil ity of being hel d accountable for 
the costs of a non-del egated policy (s�) and the abil ity to c l aim
. ' J 
credit for the benefits of a delegate� policy (a�). Conversely,
J 
legis l ator preferences for delegation decline with the benefits of the 
policy, the probabil ity of associating those benefits with government 
pol icy (p), the abil ity to c l aim credit for the benefits of a non­
del egated policy 
for the costs of 
(a�), and the probabil ity of being held a c countabl eJ 
a del egated policy (s�) .
J 
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Consider again our two cases, CB/DC and DB/CC . Their defining 
characteristics are now 
CB/DC : 1 1 d d p > q, a j > s j , a j > s j 
DB/cc : 1 1 d d p < q, aj < sj , aj < sj 
These defining characteristics and the SR assmnptions imply that 
CB/DC:
DB/CC:
1 s. 
1 J d a. > d > s.J a. J 
s � > J 
J 
1 a. J d 
d > a.s. J 
J 
Whil e these incomplete r ankings insure that the l hs of ( 5') is 
positive, they do not contain enough information to determine w hether 
the r atio of accountabil ity differences is greater than, equal to, or 
l ess than one . In the absence of any information, assmne that the 
s l ippages in ability to c l aim credit and ability to shift costs are 
equal ,  i . e .  the ratio of dif ferences equals one. Then in the CB/DC 
case a sufficient condition for the legisl ator to prefer narrow 
del egation is that bj (x) 2 cj (x). 
In Figure 1 al l (b, c) combinations 
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bel ow the 45 degree l ine through the origin would produce preferences 
for narrow delegation. Some (b, c) combinations above the l ine would 
resul t in na rrow del egation preferences as wel l, with the area of 
narrow del egation preferences getting l arger as the disparity between 
p and q increases (p > q) . An il lustr ative exampl e  (p = 4 q) appears
in the figure. 
c 
p = 4q 
CB/ DC 
pref er L 
b 
FIGURE 1 
In contr ast, the DB/CC case yiel ds a suf ficient condition for 
broad delegation preferences of b
j {x) 
� c
j (x). In Figure 2 al l (b, c) 
combinations above the 45 degree line are guaranteed to produce 
delegation preferences . Some bel ow  the line may do so as wel l, with 
the area of delegation preferences increasing with the dispa rity 
between p and q (p < q) . An il lustrative example (p = q/4) appears in 
the figure. 
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c 
DB I cc 
prefer D 
pref er D p = 4q 
prefer L 
""""'--����������������� b 
FIGURE 2 
If the r atio of accountabil ity dif ferences is not unity, the 
preceding sufficient conditions would be correspondingly affected, but 
I think that probable departures from unity would only reinforce the 
pictures conveyed by the figures . In the CB/DC case 
very l ow; given its l ower bound of zero the possibl e  
s 1 is j 
(s l -j 
al ready 
s�) J 
s l ippage is sharply limited. Thus, the ratio of slippages is more 
l ikel y than not to be less than one, which impl ies (because p > q) 
that bj (x) L cj (x) is a stronger sufficient condition than in the case 
j ust ana l y zed . Conversely, in the DB/CC case af is a l ready low so the 
possibl e  ( a � - a�) s l ippage is l imited . The r atio of s l ippages is J J 
more l ikel y than not to be greater than one which in turn impl ies 
(because q > p) that b.(x) � c,(x) is a stronger condition than in theJ J 
case where the r atio is unity . Admittedly, this argument fal ls short 
of a rigorous demonstr ation, but I think it persuasive enough to 
conclude that f igures 1 and 2 portray the general qualitative 
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imp l ic ations of the model . How wel l these general implications 
comport with what seems to be the case in the real worl d  is another 
matter . 
My mentor and discussant taught us that an important feature 
of worthwhile theory is that it suggest non-obvious hypotheses (to 
the best of my recollection, however, he never taught us how to deal
with the unfortunate f act tkat nbn-obvious hypotheses are more likely 
to be w rong than obvious ones). Thus, I am pleased to point out that 
some of the implications of the preceding analysis are at l east 
initial ly non-obvious . Moreover, I wil l make a good f aith argument 
that they are accur ate as wel l .  
Let us begin with the non-non-obvious implications . The 
general concl usion suggested by the anal ysis s11111marized in figures 1 
and 2 is that ceteris paribus those l egisl ators whose districts are 
the greatest obj ective beneficiaries of government pol icy are those 
most l ikel y  to f avor non-del egated pol icies . It is the 
representatives of loser districts and the more marginal winners who 
support del egation. The logic here is str aightforward; winners have 
greater benefits for which to c l aim credit and/or smal ler costs to 
evade than l osers. Thus, delegation of pol icy implementation may be a 
compromise big winners make in order to gain support from less 
enthusiastic col leagues . If so, there is a general suggestion that 
the greater the use of delegation tlie· less universal (geographical ly) 
the net benefits of a pol icy (if more than a maj ority of districts 
were greatly benefitted, delegation wou ld be more likely to be 
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rej ected). This does not necessarily imply that del egation entails 
increased inefficiency ( a  few districts might have huge benefit cost 
ratios and the rest c l ose to unitary ones), but del egation would seem 
to be a general accompaniment of net benefits not gener al ly 
distributed across legisl ative districts . 
A second imp l ication is somewhat l ess obvious . Figures 1 and 
2 suggest that other things equal delegation preferences are l ess 
likely in the CB/DC c ase than in the opposite DB/CC case . This seems 
to f l y  in the f ace of the prevail ing wisdom which holds that the older 
regul atory agencies with their vague mandates bene f it specific 
industries at the expense of the general consumer, while the newer 
agencies with their rel atively more specific mandates are attempts to 
benefit the average consumer, worker, citizen, etc .  at the expense of 
specific industries . Thus, the f acts seem to be that greater use of 
delegation occurs in the CB/DC case than in the DB/CC case . We could 
accept the f acts and take the coward's way out by suggesting that 
other things were not equa l ,  but l et us instead take a c l oser look at 
the facts . 
The preceding obj ection is based on an examination of 
regul atory programs, nar r ow ly defined . It compares the extent of 
delegation within a narrow range of pol icies . When the r ange is 
expanded the obj ection l oses force . The most extreme exampl e  of a 
CB/DC policy which I have been able to think of is the Price Anderson 
Act, which l imits private l iabil ity for nuclear accidents to 60 
mil lion dol l ars. This l aw benefits a particul ar industry and spreads 
the potential costs over a goodly number of gener ations of American, 
Mexican, and Canadian nationals, and it is a c lear l aw, written in 
bl ack and white, not a regul ation promul gated by the ol d AEC . 
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What is the quintessential exampl e  of "special interest 
legisl ation?• Most pol itical scientists would probably suggest either 
special tax provisions or industry specific subsidies . The tax code 
contains thous ands of the fdrmer, many of which benefit nothing so 
broad as a w hole industry; rather they provide "rel ief" for specific 
firms and even individuals . These provisions are matters of l aw, not 
simple IRS rul ings . Simil arly, subsidy programs confer quite specific 
benefits and impose extr emel y general costs, and the Congress itsel f  
sets l evels and el igibil ity requirements . Here too, the 
administr ative agencies pl ay more of a housekeeping rol e.  
Fina l ly, consider many examples of state regul ation 
occupational l icensure, l iquor regul ation, etc .  These are universa l ly 
agreed to be examples of state-sponsored c artel ization of industries . 
I hesitate to advance nation-wide conclusions here, but in the states 
with which I am famil iar the l aw was typical ly quite specific . Those 
who wish to alter the status quo lobby the l egisl ature, not the 
relev ant state agency or commission. 
In sum, when we consider a broad r ange of CB/DC pol icies we 
find numerous policies based on clear legis l ative enactments rather 
than broad del egations . This perspective in turn throws a very 
dif ferent l ight on the broad delegations best owed on the older 
economic regul atory agencies . Perhaps at origin they were DB/CC as 
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the t r aditional accounts suggest . Dismissing such accounts as 
pol yannish has been popul ar in recent years (e . g. Kolko, 1 96 5; 
Stigler, 1 971), but maybe the revisionists are too quick. I am not 
arguing that the enactment of dif fused benefit l egis l ation shou l d  be 
equated with the public interest model, nor denying that captur e  may 
occur sometime after the initial enactment of legisl ation. But if the 
l egisl ator cal culus developed in this paper seems pl ausible, the 
extensive delega tions of authority to the ol der regul atory agencies 
suggest that at l east in the beginning l egis l ators were not obviousl y  
ripping o f f  their constituents for the benefit o f  the capitalists, but 
were instead seeking re-el ection by benefitting a broad r ange of 
constituents . 
A third set of imp l ic ations concerns trends in del ega tion over 
time. The l iterature suggests a gradual increase in l egisl ative 
propensity to delega te, at l east from 1 887 to approximately 1 970, with 
something of a reversal in the past decade . The l egis l ator cal culus 
we have developed could a c commoda te such f acts (if they are f acts) in 
several ways . First, if most of regul atory history were CB/DC, 
contrary to the discussion of the preceding paragraph, then del ega tion 
would become more l ike l y  if q increased. More and better information 
about the dif fused costs of regul ation, increased organization of 
dif fused interests, more pol itical entrepreneurship in behal f of 
dif fused interests, and so forth would cause a general increase in q 
estimates and expand the region of delega tion preferences in f igure 1 .  
Al ternatively, and consistent with the discussion o f  the preceding 
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paragraph, the rise in delega tion could reflect increased l egisl ative 
efforts in beh al f of diffused interests, that is, increased a ctivity 
in the DB/CC arena. 
If the l atter suggestion were the case, then narrower 
del ega tions of recent Congresses submit to a simple exp l anation. 
Increasing organization of diffused beneficiaries -- as exemplified by 
the rise of "public interest" gr()ups -- would natura l l y  result in 
increased l egisl ator p estimates . This would contract the area of 
del eg ation preferences in f igure 2. 
I hasten to emphasize that the preceding empirical 
interpreta tions are meant as no more than suggestive. Mul tipl e  
theoretical interpretations o f  the same purported f act bring home the 
point that research which would permit a c lean meeting between theory 
and reality does not currentl y  exist . For example, the distribution 
of benefits and costs is a critical indicator of what theoretical 
wor l d  to apply, but there are great disagreements surrounding a ttempts 
to measure even aggregate benefits and costs l et al one their 
dist ribution in states and congressional districts •1 0  Mor eover, 
given reasonabl e  discount rates, the benefits and costs in question 
must be those accruing in the immediate aftermath of regul atory 
origin. Whom the ICC was benefitting in the 1 950s has little 
rel evance to l egisl ative decisions in 1 887 . 
FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Thus far we have taken x, the pol icy in question as a given. 
This might correspond to the constrained floor stage of a 
parliamentary regime, or the Congress oper ating under a closed rul e. 
Suppose x is v ariab l e, however, a pol ic y  subj e ct to amendment by 
legisl ators seeking to maximize thei r political ly rel evant ne t 
benefits . It wil l greatly simplify matters here to return to the 
origina l Shepsle-Weingast assmnption of a scal ar x .  The l e gisl ator 
maximizes his ne t benefits by choosing x so that 
which implies that 
' ' 
aj pj bj - sj qj cj 
= 0 
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Y.i - .:i.
s.qj b, J j 
(6) 
, , 
In the CB/DC c a se, (p > q) and (a > s) imp l y  that (c. > b. ) .  GivenJ J 
the properties of bj (x) (increasing at a decreasing r ate) and cj (x) 
(increasing at an increasing rate), this imp l ies that the l e gisl ator 
mazimizes his pol itical ly rel evant net bene f its function by choosing 
an x which is greater than that which would equate marginal bene f its 
and costs . Conversely, in the DB/CC case, (p < q) and (a < s )  impl y
that (c : < b : ), which given the properties of b,(x) and c,(x) imply
J J J J 
that the l egisl ator chooses an x smal l e r  than that which would equate 
marginal bene f its and costs . Thus, al lowing l egisl ators to amend the 
l evels, x, at which govermnent pol icies wou l d  be carried out 
reinforces the earl ier anal ysis of legis l ative sins of commission and 
omission . 
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How wil l delegation af fect the l e gisl ator maximization 
process? Unpredictably, it turns out . Maximizing N.(x)/D and N. (x)/L J J 
resul ts in (6a) and (6b) respective l y: 
D: 
L: 
d a. p. c . 
.....J. • :.t = .....J. 
d qj 
• 
s. b. J J 
1 a. p. c . 
.....J. • :.t = .....J. 
1 qj 
, 
s. b. J J 
(6a) 
(6b) 
If the l hs of ( 6 a) is C> = <) that of (6b), the properties of cj (x)
and bj (x) insure that the x• which maximizes Nj (x)/D is () 
= ( ) the
x•• which maximizes N.(x)/L. The l hs of (6a) is greater than the l hs J 
of ( 6b) if 
d 1 1 d aj sj > aj sj (7) 
Nothing in the shift the responsibil ity assmnptions or the defining 
characteristics of the CB/DC and DB/CC cases impl ies that (7) be true 
or false, or provides any reasonabl e  suggestion about the l ikelihood 
it holds or not. Thus, in this simple model the option to del egate 
has no systematic effect on a l egisl ator's preference for the scope of 
1 1the pol icy .  
And what o f  the ul timate que"stion, the existence and 
description of a legisl ativ e equil ibrium? Even with the assmnption of 
a sca l ar x, if l egisl ators are free to choose both the lev e l  of x and 
the extent of del egation, there i s  l ittle prospect of an equil ibrium 
(McKel vey, 1 979) . If we pl ace v arious restri ct ions on the amendment 
proce s s  (e. g . Florina, 1 982, pp. 28-3 0) an equil ibrium w il l  exi st, 
though it is s t i l l  diff icul t to de scribe that equil ibrium w ithout 
making speci f ic a ssumpt ions about funct ional form s .  And, of course 
the equil ibrium will  vary with the proce s s  a ssumptions made in the 
ana l y s i s .  Th i s  i s  a n  unfortuna te s i tua tion, my only defense being
that i t  pl agues all pol itical science theoretical efforts a t  thi s  
t i me, not j ust the preceding a na l y s i s .  
TOWARD SOCIAL RELEVANCE 
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To address once again the conference manda te, the authors were 
a sked to rel ate their reported or proposed research to "pertinent 
que st ions of regul a tory pol icy,• and to suggest "exampl e s  of research 
proj ect s  that would be useful to undertake (with rea sons rel a ted to 
pos s ib l e  appl ica tions . ) •  The temptation is to deal rather 
perfunctor i l y  with such charges, irrelevance being a l most a point of 
pride to some pol itical sc ient i s t s, but while what fol l ow s  i s  brief, 
it has the merit of sinceri ty. 
Our society i s  current l y  engaged in a w idespread a nd mul ti­
faceted deba te about the de s i rabil ity of the exi st ing regu l a tory 
order.  Cri tics charge that present day regul ation resul t s  i n  
unaccountable bureaucrats serv ing a v ariety o f  part icul a r i s t i c  
interest s ( including their own) b y  impo s ing maj or inef f ic i encies on 
the national economy. One need not accept such a wholesale 
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condemna tion o f  the exi s t ing order t o  recognize that there i s  much 
room for improvement . But to whom do we look to for that improvement ? 
Do we demand that our j udge s rev ital ize the delegation doct r i ne 
(Aranson, Gel lhorn, and Rob inson, 198 1 ) ? Even if they were so 
incl ined, that would be to r i sk confrontation w ith powerful pol itical 
interests in and out of gove�nment, a s  wel l as to l eave c i tizens to
deal w i th problems and dangers nul l if ied l eg i s l a t ion was intended to 
addre s s .  Moreover, many of the critics of the exi st ing order would 
include j udges in their bl anket indictment; unl im i ted del ega t ion 
maximizes the di scretionary power of j udges who may in turn use that 
power to further interes t s  w i th which they sympa thize -- of ten, the 
cri tics charge, the interest s of the regula tor s .  
I suppose that power-hungry bureaucrats a r e  not unheard of, 
and that more than a f ew j udge s a l low personal preferences to color 
their j udicial dec i sions, but I would not direct pol icy propo sa l s  
t oward reform o f  ei ther the bureaucracy or the j udici ary. We might a s  
wel l put f irst things f irst . The simple f act i s  that regul a tory 
program s  are created and maintained by democrat i ca l ly elected 
l eg i s l a tor s .  Those who bel ieve that the exi st ing order is too 
bureaucratic, too coerc ive, too discret ionary, or what-not must deal 
w i th the f act that the people' s representatives a l low that order to 
pers i s t .  Ei ther the evalua t ions of �he critics a re not w idel y  shared 
by the electorate (a pos s ib i l ity that probabl y deserves more 
consideration than it get s ) ,  or our understanding of the incentives 
fac ing l eg i s l a tors is not adequa te, or of course, both. These are the 
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que stions I think research propo sa l s should addr e s s ,  
The point of view i n  this paper is that l egis l a tor s de l eg a te 
not primarily in the good-intentioned hope that the experts wil l make 
be tter de cisions, nor in the innocent and under standab l e  a ttempt to 
minimiz e the cost s of making de cisions ,  Rather, de l ega tion i s  to a 
significant de gree a political decision, To be sure, there are a 
variety of pol itic a l  rea sons to de l eg a te, only one of which --shifting 
responsibility -- has been examined her e .  El sewhere (Fiorina, 1 982b ) 
I have surveyed some of these, but they de serve a great deal more 
attention, and there are undoubtedly numerous other pol itical 
considerations which other s could produce a f ter giving the que stion 
some thought ,  So, the analysis in this paper is an examp l e, at be st . 
It is intended to demonstr a te pos sibilitie s rather than to produce 
firm concl usions .  I am not certain, for exampl e, that (4) is yet rich 
enough as a model of the l egis l a tor ' s cal culus,  Nor am I ful ly 
comfor tabl e  about examining the re sponsibility shifting potential of 
del ega tion in compl e te separation f rom the pol icy transforming 
pote ntial . The l atter may be more critical,  or it may be that the 
interaction be tween the two provide s a strong political ba sis for 
delega tion. Final ly, analyse s ba sed on the preference s of individual 
l egisl a tor s r a ther than the predicted de cision of the entire 
legisl a ture are c l early se cond-b e s t ,  But given the restricted abil ity 
of our formal mode l s  to specify legisl a tive equil ibria, it is 
uncertain how soon and how closely we can approach the be s t .  
What I a m  satisfied with is the l ikel ihood that rea sonab l y  
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simp l e  mode l s  c a n  produce relatively general statement s about various 
patterns, trends, and other regul aritie s in the pol itics of 
regul a tion. The reader may not a gree with the statement s made herein, 
but if not, I urge him to do bette r .  If some pol itical scientists are 
motiv a te d  to do so, this paper wil l have succeeded; but if pol itical 
scientist s continue to argue that it a l l  depends on some critical 
incident or per sona l ity, then the conference organiz ers wil l continue 
to a sk what pol itical science has to say about their conce r n s .  
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F001NOTES 
1. To e l aborate, I a s sume that at the time of his de cision the
l egisla tor trea t s  p and q as fixed .  At l e a s t  four maj or rea l  
world f actor s  would a ffect e stimate s o f  p and q .  Th e se are ( 1) 
the form which benefits and cost s take, a s  noted in the text; ( 2 )  
t h e  characteristics of those who f eel the incidence o f  program 
consequence s ( e g .  educa tion l evel s, organiz a tional feature s); ( 3) 
the effor ts of pol itic a l  opponent s to enhance perceptions of 
program co st s; ( 4) the l e gisl a tor ' s own e f fort s  to heighten 
perceptions of program bene f it s .  Considerations ( 3) and ( 4) make 
the point that reco gnition of program bene f it s  a nd cost s hing e s  
on stra te gic behavior a s  wel l a s  o n  given characteristics o f  
public policies and those they affect. Thus, prior to the 
decision sta ge in a l egis l a ture we would e xpect policy advoca te s  
and opponent s t o  attempt to influence their col l ea gue s '  p and q 
e stimate s .  By the decision stage, however - - the focus o f  this 
analysis � I a s sume that l e gisl a tors have incorporated ( though 
not ne ce ssarily a c cur ate ly) behavioral expecta tions into their 
calcul ation s .  
2 .  Again, a t  the time o f  de cision I a s sume that a and s e stimate s are 
fixed. Al so as before, I a s sume that they incorporate both 
obj ective f actor s  and strate gic expecta tion s .  Examp l e s  o f  
obj ective factors which would serve t o  magnify attributions o f  
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re sponsibil ity would b e  ( 1) member ship i n  the l egis l a tive 
maj ority party; ( 2 )  member ship on a l egisl a tive committee with 
j urisdiction over the policy at is sue; 3) high seniority, 
l eader ship position, or other indica tions of heavyweight" status. 
Examp l e s  of strategic expectations would include ( 4) e f fort s  of 
the political oppo sition to a s sociate the l egis l a tor with program 
cost s and discount his a ssociation with program bene fit s; and ( S) 
the l egisl a tor' s own e f for ts to a s sociate himse l f  with bene fit s 
and cost s in j ust the oppo site manner .  In addition, the 
independent effor t s  of l egislative col l eague s to c l aim credit and 
avoid bl ame might a ffect a l egis l a tor ' s perceived re sponsibility, 
ie . such ef forts would be e xternalities for him. 
3 .  The public choice branch of political economy would probably 
discount the empirical significance of a symme trie s of the second 
c l a s s  in f avor of the stylized fact that real world l e gisl a ture s  
traffic primarily in "special intere st" legisl a tion. I n  
contrast, the pol itical science literature contains observations 
which sugge st the importance of a symmetrie s of the second c l a s s .  
Consider, for example, Wil son' s ( 1974, p. 1 3 9) content ion that
individual s  are more sensitive to threatened deprivations than to 
promised gains ( p  < q?), and Fiorina' s  ( 1974, p. 38-3 9) 
pre sumption of an ungrate ful ele'ctorate -- one which is more 
likely to remember who doe s  what ,12 them than who doe s what .i!!.J: 
them ( a  < s ? )  Actually, the political science wisdom and the
public choice stylized fact are mutua l ly consi stent . If the 
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former were ac curate, legisl a tive sins of omis sion would be quite 
prevalent, but by their nature they tend to be unobserved. The 
situation is reminiscent of the decisions v. nondecisions 
a rgument, so I should probabl y  say no more. 
4 .  The tentative l anguage of the paragraph in the text ref l ect s the 
f act that "concentration" and "diffusion" are ordinary l anguage 
terms which take on fairly rich meanings in the l iterature. 
Wil son (197 4 )  adopts these exact terms using concentration to 
refer to a co st or benefit " • • •  specific to a certain sector of 
society conscious of its special identity, , . • (p, 1 40 ) , and " high 
per capita" benefits or co sts conferred " . , ,on a 1111al l,  
organizabl e  sector of  society • • •  • (p,  1 58 ) . This is contra sted 
with diffusion as costs or benefit s  f al ling • • • •  on a l ar ge, 
diverse group with no sense of special identity and no 
e stablished patterns of interaction . •  (p.  1 40 ) , and " low per 
c apita" benefits or co st s imposed " • • •  on a l arge, hard-to-
organize segment of society , , , • (p,  1 58 ) , Pel tzman (197 6 )  a l so 
refers to group size and per capita stake s ,  Based o n  my reading 
of the l iterature I think that the def ining a s sumptions made in 
the text bel ow  are consistent with the manner in which v arious 
a uthor s have used the terms, concentrated and diffused, but the 
reader should bear in mind that these are my partial 
interpretations of the arguments of a heterogeneous group of 
writer s .  
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5 .  In the past the court system was viewed a s  a more natur al organ 
for the administration of public policy than it is today .  For a 
f a scinating history of j udicial administration of government 
program s  in the old Northwest Territory, see Brisbin, 1 98 1 . 
6 .  There is good reason to bel ieve that the Courts would strike down 
any broad delegation of the power to tax (Aranson, Gel lhorn, and 
Robinson, 1 981) . Nevertheless, the Congress shows l ittle 
tendency even to probe the l imits of delegation in this area , 
7 .  Mendel hoff ( 1 981) discusses this and other failures of presently 
constituted administrative regulation in the hea l th and safety 
area , 
8 .  One of Wil son' s (1980)  reviewers, FTC of ficial Robert Reich (198 0 ,  
p ,  3 7 )  regards such a proposal a s  practical, though h e  rej ects 
what he bel ieves to be its implications : 
If there is no single, non-political truth cal led the 
public interest -- or none that regul atory agencies are 
capable of discovering � why not rid our selves of 
these old bureaucracies and reas sign their 
responsibil ities to Congress? Congressional staf f s  are 
a l ready so l arge , • , that most agency staf f s  could be 
added on almo st unnoticed. Their recommendations for 
r egul ations could be fed up to el ected representatives 
fol lowing the same route a s  compl icated pieces of 
proposed l egisl ation, In short, if the l ine between 
politics and administration is a charade, why not 
obliterate it? 
9 .  El sewhere (Fiorina, 1 982b ) I have proposed that pos sible agency 
transformation of legislative enactments could be examined with 
the a i d  of an uncerta inty mode l which v iews l eg i s l ators a s  
choosing among pol icy lotte r i e s  w ith spe c if ied character i st i c s. 
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10 . See for exampl e  the cont inuing debate over mea suring the wel fare 
effec t s  o f  transportation regul a ti on cont a i ned in Spann and 
Erickson, ( 197 0 ) , Zerbe ( 1980 ) , and Braout igam and Nol l ( 1981) . 
11, In an earl ier paper (Fior ina, 1982b ) I analyzed a spe c i al ca se of 
tho SR model in which a cond it i on l ike ( 7 )  a lways held. Thus ,  in 
that spec i al ca se the opt ion t o  de l eg a te inc r ea sed e ach 
represent a t ive ' • preferred l ev e l  of regul a tion, 
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